Welcome to the Home Page of my new website, where I discuss our recent history, the present depression, the cycles of American political and economic history, and future prospects.  In the last century,of course, one of the main divisions in American politics has been the split in liberalism between supporters of free market, laissez faire capitalism and libertarianism, versus the Keynesians, progressives and social democrats (democratic socialists?), who favor a far more activist government in social and economic life. 

One of the most confusing aspects of our politics is that we often call both of these "liberalism", although they are hardly the same animal.  Yet we also call 19th Century-style liberalism "conservatism", which only adds to the confusion.  At the same time, we also describe various right-wing populist movement like the Moral Majority as "conservative", along with any other movements that want to return to an earlier status quo in moral,sexual and racial matters--whether it is a return to the 1950s, the Victorian Era or in some cases the Calvinist republics of the 17th Century. 

In my opinion, this desire to return to a supposedly simpler time--to an agrarian,small town society--that we imagine to to free of all the social and moral problems of a modern,urban culture, that is probably closer to the heart of a true conservative movement.    It's also futile, ultimately, since there is no going back except on Star Trek and shows like that  (and I'm a big fan of those!)  Outside of science fiction,however, there's no device that allows us to return to the past and alter it, although in every conservative cycle, there are certainly millions of Americans who would want to to just that, whether in economic or cultural policy.  Perhaps the key difference they have with modern liberals, progressives or social democrats is that the latter prefer to adjust to the present, but also look more toward making the future more livable.

When we talk about political cycles then, this 30-40 year shift between reform and conservatism, we're not just talking about politics but something more elemental: both in how we view the present-day world, how it stacks up against the past--at least how we imagine the past to have been--and whether we value our version of the past more than what might be coming along in the future.  Do we look forward to the future with hope or with fear?

In this very broad sense,beyond the political concerns of the moment, both reform and conservatism seem to have something eternal about them.  They are just part of the human condition and how we perceive the world, rather than one being "right" always and everywhere and the other being "wrong"--or left. 

ABOUT ME:  I have a PhD in modern history and foreign relations, and have been teaching for 22 years.  For the past 14 years, I have taught in South Korea, Turkey, Poland, Oman, Kazakhstan, Thailand and various other countries.

 
My views on Friend Finder are very simple: whatever consenting adults want to do is their own business and no concern of mine.  For those who wish to regulate and legislate such matters, as a historian I can only say good luck enforcing it.

THE SECOND GILDED AGE: THE GREAT REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973-2001--BOOK REVIEW

This is a review of my book, The Second Gilded Age, which summarizes it better than I could myself. In it, I discuss the cycles of U.S. political and economic history, with alternating periods of reform and conservatism, belief in minimal government and activist government, and also right-wing vs. left wing populism.

Viewed from this perspective, capitalism in America really does have Long Waves or Long Cycles, which are possibly generational. But over the last 150 years if not longer, it is clear that American-style capitalism has intense, free market, Gold Rush eras like the Gilded Ages and the 1920s, followed by crashes and consolidation. As always, the period 1945-73 is somewhat exceptional to this pattern , perhaps because the memories of the Great Depression were so recent and so harsh, the free market phase of capitalism was not so pronounced in this era.

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The Second Gilded Age: The Great Reaction in the United States, 1973–2001 – By Michael McHugh Timothy N. Thurber 1 1 Virginia Commonwealth University Copyright © 2008 Phi Alpha Theta ABSTRACT Abstract No Abstract DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI) 10.1111/j.1540-6563.2008.00227_28.x About DOI Article Text The Second Gilded Age: The Great Reaction in the United States, 1973–2001 . By Michael McHugh . ( : University Press of America , 2006 . Pp. v, 364 . .)

This ambitious work examines economic, political, and social trends in the United States in the late twentieth century. The period from 1973 to 2001, this author contends, should be viewed as a "second Gilded Age" because its defining features—economic elitism and social conservatism with a populist flavor—mirrored the central characteristics of the late 1800s. Although Michael McHugh gives most of his attention to the era from 1973 to 2001, he sets up that analysis by looking at two earlier periods. He begins with a brief look at the first Gilded Age. McHugh's main themes will be familiar to anyone who has studied or taught this period—economic polarization, a celebration of the market, nativism, racism, and an evangelical Protestantism that sought social control.

He then surveys the era from 1945 to 1973, which he terms the "Historical Exception Period" (58). These years, he argues, were characterized by the growth of the welfare state, increased power of unions, income gains for all classes, and a relatively strong political consensus in both major parties on the need for government to mitigate the worst effects of capitalism. This period, McHugh insists, stands in sharp contrast to what followed. The late twentieth century, he maintains, was marked by sharply increased polarization in income and wealth, stagnant wages and longer work hours for most Americans, and conservative political leaders who glorified the private sector.

This period was also notable for an emphasis on individualistic explanations for crime and a turn toward tougher punishment of criminals, revived racism against African Americans, a growing anti-immigrant backlash, and a burgeoning evangelical Protestantism that went on a "morality offensive" (233). McHugh attempts to situate this era into a larger analytical framework. "Gilded Ages are the norm in U.S. history, the default setting, given the relative brevity of liberal reform periods," he maintains (2). In this regard, he falls into line with an emerging historiographical trend that portrays the middle of the twentieth century as a brief time of reform rather than a harbinger of an expanding liberal or social democratic order.

More problematic is the overly pessimistic view McHugh offers of the 1973–2001 era. The economic problems, he notes, are indeed substantial, but he undervalues the improved standard of living that most Americans have experienced. Evangelical Protestants are vocal influential members of the Republican Party, but their impact on the broader culture is more limited. For McHugh, both Gilded Ages are times when "the elite manipulates various backlash and right-wing populist movements in its own interest" (5). Such a view understates the sincere concerns that many middle- and working-class Americans have about social and moral issues, especially the perceived influence of popular culture on youth.

Critical of a Democratic Party that he feels offers tepid opposition to the Republicans, especially on economic matters, McHugh yearns for a class-based politics but remains doubtful that a new era of economic reform is imminent. This work of synthesis will be of interest to teachers looking for a broad overview of the late twentieth century, and scholars of this period will profit from engaging with his interpretative framework